Ifposedtotheaveragepersononthestreet,thepropo-
sition that people's judgments are affected by what they want to believe would likely be met with near unanimous agreement. Phenomena such as "denial" and "wishful thinking" are part of the common parlance and are wellaccepted aspects of ordinary folk psychology. It is interesting then that these and other motivated reasoning phenomena, which are so intuitively appealing, have been considerably more problematic on a formal scientific level (Ditto, Scepansky, Munro, Apanovitch, & Lockhart, 1998; Erdelyi, 1974) .
Historically, attempts to demonstrate motivational influences on judgment have been hampered by two general problems. The first is a lack of theoretical specificity regarding the process by which motivational forces (e.g., wishes and fears) influence judgment. In contrast, for example, to the vast literature specifying the multiple pathways through which expectations can perturb the generic information-processing sequence (Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996) , accounts of motivational influence on judgment often have been more descriptive than explanatory. The second and more pervasive problem, however, has been the difficulty of disentangling, at an empirical level, motivational influences on judgment outcomes from other nonmotivational influences. The classic example of this problem is the difficulty of distin-guishing the role of motivation and expectation in selfserving bias (e.g., Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Miller & Ross, 1975) . Put most simply, when an individual offers an external attribution for a poor academic performance, this could either be because the person did not want to fail or because the person did not expect to fail. The difficulty of disentangling these two explanations to provide unambiguous evidence of motivational influences on judgment has plagued research on motivated reasoning since the downfall of the New Look movement in the 1950s (e.g., Erdelyi, 1974; Howes & Soloman, 1950) .
The Quantity of Processing View of Motivated Reasoning
In an attempt to specify one central way in which motivation affects the information-processing sequence, Ditto and Lopez (1992) proposed the quantity of processing (QOP) view of motivated reasoning (see also Ditto et al., 1998; Lopez, Ditto, & Waghorn, 1994) . Drawing on a diverse body of theory and research in the fields of persuasion (Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) , social judgment (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Kruglanski, 1990) , and the affect-cognition interface (Pratto & John, 1991; Schwarz, 1990) , the QOP view asserts that the tendency to more readily embrace information that is consistent with a preferred judgment conclusion than information that is inconsistent with a preferred judgment conclusion stems from the simple fact that the former is less likely than the latter to initiate effortful cognitive analysis. Specifically, when presented with information they want to believe (e.g., information suggesting intelligence, likeability, or good health), people tend to accept the validity of the information unthinkingly. Information with unwanted implications, on the other hand, is more likely to evoke an effortful cognitive appraisal in which alternative explanations for the information are considered and, consequently, the validity of the information is called into question. Stated most succinctly, the central notion of the QOP view is that people are simply more skeptical consumers of information they do not want to believe than of information they do want to believe.
Several studies have provided empirical support for the QOP view. Relative to individuals presented with preference-consistent information, those confronted with preference-inconsistent information require more data before accepting the validity of the information (Ditto & Lopez, 1992) , generate more alternative explanations for the information (Ditto & Lopez, 1992) , are more likely to recognize situational constraint in attributions about the information (Ditto et al., 1998) , and are more sensitive to the probability of alternative explanations for the information (Ditto et al., 1998) . Although each of these findings offers strong indirect support for the relatively intensive processing of preference-inconsistent information, the most straightforward prediction of the QOP view-that individuals will be more likely to spontaneously question the validity of preferenceinconsistent than preference-consistent informationhas received less clear support. Indeed, past research has provided mixed evidence regarding the role of positive and negative outcomes in the initiation of spontaneous cognitive activity.
Spontaneous Causal Attribution
Stimulated by a seminal article by Wong and Weiner (1981) , a number of studies have attempted to document the conditions under which individuals spontaneously engage in cognitive activity such as attributional reasoning. This body of work has identified two primary antecedents of spontaneous causal analysis: unexpected outcomes (e.g., Clary & Tesser, 1983; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1981; Sanna & Turley, 1996) and negative (failure) outcomes (e.g., Bohner, Bless, Schwarz, & Strack, 1988; Gilovich, 1983; Sanna & Turley, 1996) .
Echoing a similar debate within the motivated reasoning literature, however, the extent to which the role of negative outcomes can be separated from that of unexpected outcomes has been controversial. In the most well-articulated expression of this position, Kanazawa (1992) concluded that there is neither a theoretical nor an empirical basis in support of the hypothesis that negative outcomes spontaneously elicit causal attributions independent of expectancy. At the theoretical level, Kanazawa argued that although there were clear adaptive reasons why unexpected events should evoke more attributional activity than expected ones, there was no similar rationale to expect failure to be more thought provoking than success. At the empirical level, Kanazawa argued that past research showing an independent effect of outcome information could be explained by either improper manipulation of outcome valence or the lack of truly spontaneous measures of attributional activity. Identical to the problem that has vexed research on self-serving attributional bias, Kanazawa argued that past studies of spontaneous attribution used confounded manipulations of outcome valence and that no checks were included to refute the possibility that the failure feedback was simply less expected than the success feedback. This problem is compounded by the lack of truly spontaneous measures of attributional thought. According to Kanazawa, nonspontaneous measures of attributional reasoning are subject to demand characteristics to provide an explanation (i.e., excuse) for failure. Thus, to the extent that a measure of attributional reasoning prompts the participant to offer an explanation for the outcome, it is not only a poor test of hypotheses regarding truly "spontaneous" causal reasoning but it is biased toward demonstrating an effect for outcome valence. Kanazawa (1992) supported his claims with two experiments. In Study 1, participants imagined a student named John who was either an A or a C student in high school (the expectancy manipulation) and performed either well (3.5 GPA) or poorly (1.0 GPA) in college (the outcome manipulation). Participants then retold the story with the dependent measure being the frequency of causal statements spontaneously used in the retelling (Clary & Tesser, 1983) . Manipulation checks confirmed that the two expectancy groups differed in ratings of expectedness and the two outcome groups differed in ratings of success. The results revealed only an expectancy main effect such that unexpected outcomes elicited more spontaneous causal statements than did expected outcomes. In Study 2, participants imagined that they were either well prepared or not well prepared to take the advanced placement test for math and then performed either well (top 5%) or poorly (bottom 5%). Participants then either retold the story (spontaneous measure) or were prompted to provide causal attributions (nonspontaneous measure). After the success of the manipulations was again confirmed, results showed that the spontaneous measure was affected only by outcome expectedness and the nonspontaneous measure was affected only by the outcome valence. Kanazawa concluded from these studies that past research showing that negative outcomes elicit spontaneous causal attributions was methodologically flawed and that when these flaws are eliminated, outcome valence has no independent effect on spontaneous cognitive activity.
Critiquing the Kanazawa Critique
We find a number of problems with both Kanazawa's (1992) theoretical analysis and his empirical data. First, Kanazawa contends that people should be equally motivated to determine the causes of success and failure. A review of the social cognition literature, however, reveals strong theoretical support for the prediction that negative information and negative affective states produce more extensive cognitive processing than do positive information and positive affective states (e.g., Schwarz, 1990; Taylor, 1991) . The general logic underlying this work is that because positive affect signals that the current environment is safe and satisfying (e.g., Frijda, 1988) it leaves individuals free to engage in loose, heuristicbased thinking (Bless et al., 1996; Isen, 1984) . Negative affect, on the other hand, signals the need for an immediate behavioral response (to avoid loss or harm) and consequently evokes a "mobilization" response (Taylor, 1991) that includes a focusing of attention and an increase in detail-oriented cognitive analysis. This logic is central to the QOP model and, as such, challenges Kanazawa's stance that there is no theoretical basis for predicting greater spontaneous cognitive activity in response to negative than positive outcome information.
Second, although the empirical critique offered by Kanazawa (1992) is clearly correct in that past studies have often failed to confirm independent manipulations of outcome and expectancy, the studies he reports inexplicably fall prey to the identical problem. Although the studies reported t tests confirming that the expectedoutcome conditions were perceived as more expected than the unexpected-outcome conditions, they failed to make the crucial comparison examining whether the positive and negative outcome conditions were equated for perceived expectedness. This is particularly important because the Kanazawa studies (similar to virtually all past work in the area) made no attempt to equate the objective likelihood of the success and failure feedback (e.g., via the use of base-rate information).
Finally, Kanazawa's (1992) research exemplifies another problem that is rampant in the spontaneous causal attribution literature: the use of weak outcome manipulations. Kanazawa's participants were asked to imagine John (Study 1) or themselves (Study 2) receiving a positive or negative outcome. Imagining a success or failure experience, however, packs little of the emotional impact of real-life success or failure. This is crucial in the current context because the QOP view explicitly identifies the differential affective response to positive and negative information as the driving force behind the differential allocation of cognitive resources to the two types of information (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Schwarz, 1990) . The use of weak, imagination-based manipulations, therefore, places the outcome manipulation at a distinct disadvantage compared to the expectancy manipulation in producing spontaneous cognitive activity.
Disentangling Motivation and Expectation
The current research sought to examine the prediction-derived from the QOP view of motivated reasoning-that individuals are more likely to spontaneously question the validity of preference-inconsistent than preference-consistent information. It is not our contention that expectations have no effect on spontaneous cognitive activity; the evidence is clear that they do (e.g., Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1981) . Rather, our goal is simply to show that over and above the effect of expectations, outcome valence has an independent effect such that negative feedback is more likely to generate spontaneous cognitive activity than is positive feedback even when the objective likelihood of the feedback is identical. We provide a stringent test of this prediction by (a) using an outcome manipulation expected to produce a significant affective reaction in participants, (b) equat-ing the objective likelihood of positive and negative feedback with statistical information, (c) including manipulation checks to assess the effects of our manipulations on both perceived expectedness and affective response, and (d) using a measure of cognitive activity that is both intuitively compelling and truly "spontaneous." STUDY 1 Study 1 used an affectively involving experimental procedure in which participants take a bogus medical test and receive either a favorable or an unfavorable result (Ditto & Croyle, 1995) . Within this paradigm, a method of assessing spontaneous behavioral reactions to the test result has been developed. Ditto and Lopez (1992, Study 2) secretly observed participants' reactions while self-administering the medical test, finding that participants whose results indicated that they were at risk for future pancreatic disease took longer to decide the test was complete and were more likely to recheck the results of the test than were participants discovering that they did not have the risk factor. Ditto and Lopez acknowledged, however, that the study failed to control for participants' expectations about the diagnostic information. Because the college student participants who administered the test likely expected it to yield a "healthy" result (health being statistically more likely than illness, particularly for college students), it is unclear whether the relatively skeptical reaction observed in response to the unfavorable diagnosis was caused by its unexpectedness or its undesirability.
Study 1 attempted to remove this potential confound by using prevalence information to equate participants' beliefs about the likelihood of receiving favorable and unfavorable test results. Moreover, measures were included to assess both participants' perceptions of the expectedness of their diagnostic outcomes and their affective responses to it, with the goal of disentangling the effects of expectancy and outcome valence in eliciting spontaneous cognitive activity.
Method PARTICIPANTS
Seventy-seven undergraduate students participated in exchange for course credit. Data from 10 participants were discarded for misunderstanding the manipulations, and data from 3 others were discarded because of voiced suspicions about the study. The final sample consisted of 64 participants, 17 men and 47 women.
PROCEDURE
The general procedure used in this study has been described in detail elsewhere (see Ditto & Croyle, 1995 , for a review) and thus will be described here emphasizing aspects of the procedure unique to this study.
Individual participants arrived at a small laboratory room to participate in a study on "the relationship between psychological characteristics and physical health." A blood pressure test was administered along with a "test result report." Participants were informed that a test result report would be completed after each administration of a physical test. No participant had unusually high or low blood pressure.
After completing several personality measures, the experimental manipulations were introduced as part of the next test, the (fictitious) TAA saliva reaction test. The description stated that researchers had recently discovered a condition called "TAA-negativity" characterized by the absence of a particular enzyme (thioamine acetylase) in the body. TAA-negativity was said to affect pancreatic functioning in people after the age of 30. The experimenter then described a simple self-administered test for the condition consisting of placing a small amount of saliva in a cup, rubbing a "TAA-reactive strip" in the saliva, and looking for a color reaction. Participants were told that if the strip came in contact with saliva in which TAA was absent (indicating TAAnegativity), it would show no color reaction, but if it came in contact with saliva containing TAA (indicating normal TAA status), it would change from its normal yellow color to a dark green. Color development in the moistened test strip was said to "take anywhere from 10 seconds to 1 minute." As soon as the test result was clear, participants were told to "as quickly as possible" place the strip in a small envelope to "provide us with a permanent record of your test result."
Participants were then left alone to conduct the test and told to complete the test result report (described below) as soon as the test was completed. When participants administered the test, the test strip (actually a piece of yellow construction paper) remained yellow for all participants. Thus, all participants were led to believe that they had TAA-negativity; however, their beliefs about its health implications were manipulated as part of the instructions. Specifically, some participants were told that TAA-negativity had healthy consequences ("people who are TAA-negative are 10 times less likely to experience pancreatic disease than are people whose secretory fluids contain TAA") and others that it had unhealthy consequences ("people who are TAA-negative are 10 times more likely to experience pancreatic disease than are people whose secretory fluids contain TAA"). Thus, when participants saw the lack of color reaction after dipping the test strip in their saliva, some interpreted that as a favorable test result indicating a relative immunity to pancreatic disease, whereas others interpreted it as an unfavorable test result indicating a relative susceptibility to pancreatic disease. To control participants' expectations about the likelihood of having TAA-negativity, descriptions of the condition in the favorable and unfavorable test result conditions contained identical prevalence information stating that preliminary research indicated that TAA-negativity was found in "1 out of every 10 people (10%)."
DEPENDENT MEASURES
Written measures of defensiveness. The test result report form included two items assessing participants' beliefs about the accuracy of their TAA test (Ditto et al., 1998) . Participants rated their confidence in the accuracy of the test (not at all confident to very confident) and the test's likelihood of yielding a similar result if taken again (very unlikely to very likely) on 9-point scales.
Videotape measures of skepticism. Unbeknownst to participants, their actions during the administration of the TAA test were videotaped. The videotapes were edited to remove all indications of assigned condition, and these segments were viewed by two judges. Participants' behaviors were coded for two behavioral indicators of "spontaneous skepticism." First, judges recorded the amount of time each participant required to decide that the TAA test was complete, that is, that no color reaction was going to take place (Ditto & Lopez, 1992) . Judges were instructed to frame participants' decisions on one side by the dipping of the test strip in the saliva and on the other by the sealing of the test strip in the provided envelope. Second, the judges counted the number of test validity rechecking behaviors engaged in by each participant. These included any of the following behaviors: redipping the initial test strip in the saliva sample, testing a different test strip, testing a different saliva sample, and reopening the envelope after depositing the test strip. The judges' ratings were highly correlated for both the decision latency, r(64) = .90, p < .001, and rechecking behavior judgments, r(64) = .89, p < .001, and thus, the average of the two ratings was used in all analyses.
Affective reaction to test result. To assess participants' affective reactions to their test results, the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) was included as part of the test result report, and, thus, participants completed it once prior to receiving their TAA test result (i.e., after receiving their blood pressure test result) and once immediately after receiving their TAA test result. The positive and negative affect items were summed, and the indexes from the pretest administration were then subtracted from the corresponding indexes from the posttest administration creating positive and negative affect difference scores for every participant where higher numbers indicate increased positive or negative affect reported after the TAA test.
Perceived likelihood of test outcome. Two measures were included to assess participants' perceptions of the likelihood of the test results. First, the test result form included a 9-point item measuring self-reported surprise with the diagnosis (Ditto et al., 1998) . Second, half of the participants also completed a prediagnosis measure of perceived likelihood. Immediately after reading the description of the TAA saliva reaction test but before selfadministering the test, half of the participants rated the likelihood of having TAA-negativity on a 9-point scale (very unlikely to very likely). Because we were unsure whether prompting participants to consider their beliefs about the likelihood of receiving a positive or negative test result would affect their reactions to it once received, we included the measure for only half of the participants so that we could assess the effects of its inclusion on subsequent reactions.
DEBRIEFING
Immediately after responding to the dependent measures, participants completed a thorough process debriefing. All participants allowed the researchers to use their videotapes, and no distress in response to the experimental manipulations was observed.
Results
Two (outcome: favorable vs. unfavorable) × 2 (prediagnosis likelihood measure: present vs. absent) analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted on all variables. Inclusion of the prediagnosis likelihood measure had no significant effects on reactions to the test result information, and, thus, all results are reported collapsed across this manipulation.
MANIPULATION CHECKS
Because the experience of affect is thought to be central to any asymmetrical effects of favorable and unfavorable outcomes, responses to the PANAS were first analyzed as a check on the outcome manipulation. Consistent with the intent of the manipulation, the ANOVAs revealed only significant outcome main effects for both the positive, F(1, 60) = 7.18, p < .01, and negative, F(1, 60) = 6.16, p < .02, affect difference scores. Participants receiving a favorable test result reported an increase in positive affect (M = 1.11) and a decrease in negative affect (M = -1.51), whereas those receiving an unfavorable test result reported a decrease in positive affect (M = -2.50) and an increase in negative affect (M = 1.15; see Table 1 ).
The second set of manipulation checks assessed whether outcome was successfully manipulated while holding expectancy constant. An ANOVA on the postdiagnosis surprise measure revealed that the out-come manipulation did affect self-reported surprise, F(1, 60) = 5.79, p < .02. Despite the fact that participants received identical prevalence information regarding the likelihood of having TAA-negativity, participants reported more surprise when this was described as an unfavorable diagnosis (M = 6.97) than when it was described as a favorable diagnosis (M = 5.68). Confirming the results of the surprise measure, a significant effect for outcome also was found on the prediagnosis likelihood measure, F(1, 30) = 7.37, p < .02. Prior to receiving their test results, participants told that TAAnegativity was a risk factor for pancreatic disease reported a lower likelihood that they would have the condition (M = 2.41) than did those told that TAAnegativity protected them from pancreatic disease (M = 3.80).
DEFENSIVENESS MEASURES
Consistent with past research (Ditto & Croyle, 1995) , participants were more critical of the accuracy of unfavorable than favorable test results. Participants in the unfavorable result condition reported less confidence that the test was accurate (M = 4.41) and rated the test as less likely to repeat itself (M = 5.15) than did those in the favorable result condition (Ms = 6.92 and 6.98, respectively; ps < .001).
SPONTANEOUS SKEPTICISM MEASURES
The key measures in the current study were the behavioral dependent measures that were observed as the participants interpreted the test results but prior to the written measures that were prompted by the researchers. Consistent with the predictions of the QOP view, an ANOVA on the decision latency measure revealed a significant outcome main effect, F(1, 60) = 15.69, p < .001. Participants who believed that the test strip's lack of a color reaction indicated an unfavorable result took, on average, almost a minute longer to decide that the test result was complete (M = 153.9 s) than did participants who believed the lack of a color reaction indicated a favorable result (M = 94.4 s).
By itself, the fact that participants took longer to accept the validity of an unfavorable than a favorable test result does not demonstrate that the unfavorable result generated a more vigorous cognitive response. Participants confronted with the unwanted diagnosis might have simply been in a state of passive disbelief rather than active skeptical thinking. The measure of spontaneous rechecking behavior, however, does not support this picture, again revealing a significant outcome main effect, F(1, 60) = 4.75, p < .04. Consistent with the predictions of the QOP view, participants in the unfavorable test result condition exhibited more spontaneous rechecking behaviors (M = 1.94) than did those in the favorable test result condition (M = 0.94).
Discussion
The results from Study 1 demonstrate that participants responded more skeptically to an unfavorable than a favorable medical test result. This was evident both from participants' responses to direct questions about the accuracy of their test results (replicating the results of several previous studies using this paradigm) (Ditto & Croyle, 1995) and from their behavioral reactions to their test results captured on videotape. It is important to note that these behavioral measures of skepticism were completely "spontaneous" in that no questions of any kind were asked and participants had no contact with the experimenter between receipt of their test result and the behavioral measures. The videotapes clearly show, however, that presented with an unchanging test strip, participants who believed this indicated relative susceptibility to pancreatic disease required more time to accept that no change was going to take place than did participants believing this indicated relative immunity to pancreatic disease. More important, participants were also more likely to spontaneously "recheck" the validity of their test result when they believed it to be an unfavorable than a favorable outcome. Whereas favorable result participants appeared content to accept the validity of the test result quickly and without additional scrutiny, unfavorable result participants were more likely to engage in behaviors suggesting that they were considering explanations for the lack of color reaction other than their lack of the TAA enzyme. By redipping their test strips or adding additional saliva to their testing samples, participants seem to be considering the possibility that their original test strips may have been "duds" or that the strips may not have had sufficient contact with their saliva to generate a color reaction. Similarly, participants who reopened the envelope to reexamine their test strips may have been considering the possibility that their test strips were just slow to activate and might still change color if given enough time. Of course, our use of purely behavioral indicators to obtain a spontaneous measure of motivated skepticism precludes us from drawing strong inferences about underlying cognitions. Still, the fact that both this and past studies have documented numerous examples of heightened skepticism to preference-inconsistent information using nonspontaneous "cognitive" measures (e.g., ratings of test accuracy, generation of alternative explanations) suggests that the relatively vigorous behavioral response shown by participants to the unfavorable test result is due to a similar skeptical reaction. The question less clearly answered by Study 1, however, is the extent to which this skeptical response to unfavorable feedback can be attributed unambiguously to an affective-motivational process. In a key improvement over past research, the current study used manipulation of outcome valence, and inclusion of a pre-post measure of affective responses to the diagnostic information to confirm that the test result manipulation produced differential affective reactions in participants. In another improvement over past studies, the procedure provided participants with probability information in an attempt to control their expectations about the likelihood of TAA-negativity across the two levels of outcome. And yet, despite the fact that participants in both the favorable and unfavorable result conditions were given identical information about the prevalence of TAAnegativity (10%), unfavorable result participants nonetheless reported a lower likelihood of having the condition prior to receiving their test results and more surprise after receiving their test results than did favorable result participants. At least at the subjective level, then, Study 1 is vulnerable to the criticism of confounding favorability of the feedback with its likelihood of occurrence. Of course, one might argue that from an experimental perspective, as long as the objective information provided to participants is equivalent, no confound exists. Still, the intriguing disconnect between the objective information and participants' subjective reactions to it is problematic from the standpoint of trying to disentangle the specific effects of expectation and motivation on spontaneous cognitive activity. Consequently, a second study was conducted to try to address this issue.
STUDY 2
Study 2 used the same basic procedure as Study 1 with two simple changes. First, in Study 1, it was clear that including the prediagnosis likelihood measure did not affect participants' responses on subsequent measures. Thus, every participant in Study 2 completed the prediagnosis measure. Second, because Study 1 held prevalence information constant for every participant, it was unclear to what extent this information influenced their reactions to the diagnostic information. In Study 2, the probability of having TAA-negativity was highlighted on the TAA instruction sheet (underlined in bold text) and manipulated independently of outcome valence to assess its impact on participants' reactions.
Method

PARTICIPANTS
One hundred and two undergraduate students completed the experiment for course credit. Five participants misunderstood the manipulations, three were suspicious of the TAA manipulation, and two inaccurately reported that the TAA test strip turned green. These 10 participants were eliminated from the analyses, leaving 92 participants, 27 men and 65 women.
PROCEDURE
The procedure of Study 2 was identical to that of Study 1 with the exceptions described above. Most important, before self-administering the TAA test, the objective prevalence of TAA-negativity was manipulated orthogonally to outcome valence. Half of the participants were told that preliminary research indicated that about 1 in 3 people (33%) have TAA-negativity (highprevalence condition), whereas half were told that about 1 in 20 (5%) people have the condition (low-prevalence condition).
Results
Unless otherwise noted, all analyses were 2 (outcome: favorable vs. unfavorable) × 2 (prevalence: high vs. low) ANOVAs.
MANIPULATION CHECKS
As in Study 1, both the positive and negative affect difference scores revealed only significant outcome main effects, positive: F(1, 88) = 4.27, p < .05; negative: F(1, 88) = 22.31, p < .001. As expected, participants in the favorable condition reported an increase in positive affect (M = 0.37) and a decrease in negative affect (M = -1.54), whereas those in the unfavorable condition reported a decrease in positive affect (M = -1.71) and an increase in negative affect (M = 4.64; see Table 2 ).
For the prediagnosis likelihood measure, there was a significant prevalence main effect, F(1, 88) = 3.82, p = .05. Supporting the effectiveness of the prevalence manipulation, participants in the high-prevalence condition reported a greater likelihood of having TAA-negativity (M = 3.79) than did those in the low-prevalence condition (M = 3.02). As in Study 1, however, there was once again a significant outcome main effect, F(1, 88) = 14.53, p < .001. Participants believing that TAA-negativity was an unfavorable outcome reported a smaller likelihood that they would have the condition (M = 2.66) than did those believing that TAA-negativity was a favorable outcome (M = 4.15). Results from the postdiagnosis surprise measure supported those from the prediagnosis likelihood measure. Participants in the high-prevalence condition reported less surprise (M = 5.82) about their test result than did those in the low-prevalence condition (M = 7.14), F(1, 88) = 7.18, p < .01, and participants in the unfavorable result condition reported more surprise (M = 7.28) about their test result than did those in the favorable result condition (M = 5.67), F(1, 88) = 10.76, p < .01.
DEFENSIVENESS MEASURES
Participants in the unfavorable conditions were less confident that the test was accurate (M = 4.55) and rated the test as less likely to repeat itself (M = 5.08) than did those in the unfavorable conditions (Ms = 6.94 and 7.11, respectively; ps < .001). The prevalence manipulation had no affect on either measure (see Table 2 ).
SPONTANEOUS SKEPTICISM MEASURES
As in Study 1, the codings of two judges were highly correlated for both the decision latency, r(88) = .98, p < .001, and rechecking behavior, r(88) = .97, p < .001, measures, and so average codings were computed. 
HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION ANALYSES
Because it again proved impossible to disentangle the roles of motivation and expectation via experimental manipulation, we approached the problem statistically using hierarchical regression. The logic of these analyses was to use measured affect and subjective likelihood as proxies for the outcome valence and prevalence manipulations to determine if participants' affective responses to the test information improved prediction of spontaneous skepticism beyond that attributable to expectancy violation. To generate an overall measure of affective response, the affect measures were combined by subtracting the negative affect difference scores from the positive affect difference scores. Similarly, the subjective expectancy measures were combined by averaging the pretest likelihood and posttest surprise ratings (after reverse scoring the latter). Finally, a composite skepticism measure was created by standardizing and averaging the decision latency and rechecking behavior measures.
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Regression equations were created by entering the expectancy index as the predictor variable during the first step and adding the affect index during the second step. This analytical strategy was chosen because it tests our key prediction that affective reactions to the feedback should predict spontaneous skepticism over and above the contribution of subjective likelihood.
These analyses revealed that ∆R 2 was significantly different from zero for both Step 1, ∆R 2 = .09, F inc (1, 86) = 8.71, p < .01, and Step 2, ∆R 2 = .07, F inc (1, 85) = 7.12, p < .01. As would be expected from past research, the expectancy index was a significant predictor of spontaneous skepticism (β after entry of all IVs = -.22) such that the less likely (more surprising) the test result was perceived to be, the more skeptical the participant's response. Of importance, however, the affect index independently predicted spontaneous skepticism (β after entry of all IVs = -.28) indicating that over and above the effect of perceived likelihood, the less positive/more negative was participants' affective response to the test result, the more skepticism they showed in response to it.
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Discussion
The results of Study 2 closely replicated those of Study 1. Consistent with the predictions of the QOP view, participants responded more skeptically to an unfavorable than a favorable test result. Also similar to Study 1, however, participants again perceived the unfavorable result as more surprising than the favorable result, even though objective base-rate information suggested that they were equally likely occurrences. In fact, the outcome manipulation had a stronger effect on perceived likelihood and surprise than did a manipulation explicitly intended to influence the subjective likelihood of the test result with statistical (prevalence) information. In Study 2, therefore, we sought to disentangle the roles of motivation and expectancy via statistical means. The goal of these analyses was identical to that of the original experimental design: control for the subjective likelihood of the test result and examine whether the desirability of the information independently influenced reactions to it. The results revealed that both expectations and motivation influenced spontaneous skepticism. Although the prevalence manipulation did not have a significant effect on either skepticism measure, the more sensitive regression analyses showed that participants were more skeptical of the test result the more subjectively unlikely it was perceived to be. Most important for the current purposes, the regression analyses also revealed that participants' affective responses to their test results were independently predictive of spontaneous skepticism. In other words, consistent with the predictions of the QOP view, the results showed that over and above any effect of expectations, the more negatively participants responded to the feedback, the more skeptical they were of it. As a whole, then, the results of Study 2 provide a compelling challenge to Kanazawa's (1992) contention that the effect of outcome valence on spontaneous cognitive activity is solely a function of expectancy processes.
The lingering question, of course, is why participants once again perceived the unfavorable test result as a more surprising outcome than the favorable test result. It might be argued that despite our best efforts to control the objective information provided to participants, our outcome manipulation should still be considered "confounded" in that it failed to manipulate outcome valence independent of subjective likelihood. In most past studies, the confounding of outcome and expectancy has a rational basis in that participants have good reason to expect to succeed. Miller and Ross (1975) , for example, argued that because most college students have a record of past academic success, they expect to succeed rather than fail when presented with the academic tasks that are standard practice in many self-serving bias studies (see Kanazawa, 1992 , for elaboration of this argument). Our design's use of statistical information to equate the objective likelihood of favorable and unfavorable outcomes addressed this "rational" confounding. Still, it might be argued that our statistical information was simply overwhelmed by the wealth of intuition participants could draw on suggesting the robust health of college students in general (and themselves in particular) and thus the relative implausibility of receiving an unfavorable medical test result.
This persistent difficulty of manipulating outcome valence without also affecting subjective likelihood, however, begs the question of why these two variables are so intimately confounded. Stated more specifically, why is it so often the case that we perceive positive outcomes as more likely to occur than negative ones?
One obvious answer to this question is that subjective likelihood is itself subject to motivational influence. The effect of outcome valence on subjective likelihood ratings has been studied extensively under the rubric of unrealistic optimism (Weinstein, 1980 (Weinstein, , 1984 . This body of research has shown repeatedly that when asked to evaluate their chances of experiencing future events, individuals rate themselves as less likely than average to experience negative events (e.g., divorce) and more likely than average to experience positive events (e.g., professional success). Moreover, recent research suggests that unrealistic optimism has its primary basis in the motivation to see one's self and future favorably (Regan, Snyder, & Kassin, 1995) .
Even closer to the current studies, however, is research done in the early 1950s by Marks (1951) and Irwin (1953) . Using a game-playing procedure consisting of multiple trials, each study manipulated the desirability of outcomes (gaining or losing a point) and the objective probability of the outcome occurring (.1, .3, .5, .7, or .9). In both studies, although participants were clearly sensitive to the stated probabilities supplied to them, they nonetheless assigned a higher probability of occurrence to desirable than undesirable outcomes even when the objective probabilities of the outcomes were identical.
What these bodies of research suggest is that rather than being an experimental artifact to be controlled or eliminated, the differential likelihood ratings for favorable and unfavorable feedback may themselves be a product of the motivational implications of the outcome valence manipulation. Study 3 was conducted to examine this possibility. STUDY 3 One classic strategy of demonstrating motivational influences on judgment is the use of observer participants (e.g., Ditto et al., 1998; Holton & Pyszczynski, 1989) . The logic underlying this type of study is that if self-serving motivations are crucial to producing an observed pattern of bias, uninvolved individuals with an information base identical to that of the involved individuals should not show the same pattern. Accordingly, Study 3 provided a set of "observer participants" with the same information as the Study 2 participants and asked them to make judgments analogous to the prediagnosis likelihood ratings of Studies 1 and 2. If participants in Study 3, similar to those in Studies 1 and 2, perceive the positive test result as more likely than the negative test result, then a motivational account of this difference would not be supported. If Study 3 participants, on the other hand, show no difference in likelihood judgments as a function of outcome valence, then a motivational account is implied.
Method
One hundred and three undergraduate students read a short description of "Participant X," who was described as an average college student, and his experiences during an experiment. The vignette detailed the procedure of Study 2 from the participants' perspective. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of the four TAA instructions sheets used in Study 2 containing the outcome and prevalence manipulations. Participants then estimated the likelihood that Participant X would have TAA-negativity on the same prediagnosis likelihood scale used in Studies 1 and 2.
Results
The likelihood measure revealed a highly significant prevalence main effect, F(1, 99) = 13.45, p < .001. Participants estimated that there was a greater likelihood that Participant X would have TAA-negativity when the condition was said to be present in 33% of the general population (M = 3.78) than when it was said to be present in only 5% of the general population (M = 2.67). In contrast to Studies 1 and 2, however, the outcome main effect did not approach significance, F(1, 99) = .08, p = .78. Participants actually gave slightly higher likelihood ratings in the unfavorable result condition (M = 3.27) than in the favorable result condition (M = 3.19).
Discussion
The pattern of subjective likelihood ratings shown in Study 3 was quite different from the patterns shown in Studies 1 and 2 and is consistent with a motivational account of these findings. Participants in Studies 1 and 2, making expectancy judgments about outcomes immediately relevant to themselves, rated a favorable test result as more likely than an unfavorable test result with the same objective probability of occurrence. Participants in Study 3, making expectancy judgments about outcomes irrelevant to their own personal health, rated the favorable and unfavorable test results as equally likely to occur. Of importance, the fact that our observer participants were sensitive to the prevalence manipulation in their likelihood judgments suggests that the lack of an outcome valence effect is not simply due to a general lack of involvement with or attention to the stimulus materials.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of the current research was to examine the prediction that individuals are more likely to spontaneously question the validity of information inconsistent with a preferred judgment conclusion than information consistent with a preferred judgment conclusion. The challenge of addressing this goal was to design a study that could disentangle the roles of motivation and expectation in reactions to preference-consistent and preference-inconsistent feedback, a challenge that past research has not met well. The designs of Studies 1 and 2 improved on past research in a number of ways, and results showed that when presented with favorable and unfavorable health information with an equal objective probability of occurrence, participants were more likely to spontaneously question the unfavorable information. Furthermore, in both studies, participants reported differential affective responses to the feedback, and, in Study 2, these affective responses significantly predicted the behavioral measures of spontaneous skepticism over and above the effects of expectations.
Revisiting the QOP View of Motivated Reasoning
The results of Studies 1 and 2 provide the most straightforward evidence to date in support of the central tenet of the QOP view of motivated reasoning: Preference-inconsistent information spontaneously elicits a more thoughtful analysis than does preferenceconsistent information. The key limitation of our behavioral measures is that they can only be used to infer the amount of thought elicited by the information. The key strength of the behavioral measures, however, is that unlike written measures of defensiveness, they were completely unprompted by the experimenters. These findings add to the accumulating evidence using a variety of operationalizations of "thought" (e.g., the generation of alternative explanations, recognition of situational constraint information), providing convergent support for the QOP view (Ditto et al., 1998; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Lopez et al., 1994) .
Second, the findings are consistent with the QOP hypothesis that affect provides the motivational energy for spontaneous skepticism. Concluding a causal link between affect and cognitive activity from the current findings would be inappropriate given that the evidence linking the two in Study 2 employed correlational techniques. Clearly, however, the current results are consistent with a wealth of past experimental research showing negative affect to initiate a relatively vigorous cognitive response (e.g., Bless et al., 1996) . Future research using both experimental manipulations of affect and more comprehensive measures of specific aspects of affective response is necessary to bolster our understanding of the role of affect in motivated reasoning.
Revisiting Research on Spontaneous Causal Attribution
Studies 1 and 2 also were intended to address Kanazawa's (1992) critique of past research on spontaneous causal attributions. Kanazawa argued that there was neither a theoretical rationale nor empirical support for an independent effect of outcome on spontaneous attributional thought. It seems clear now, in light of recent social cognition research, that a compelling theoretical rationale exists to expect negative feedback to initiate relatively extensive cognitive processing, particularly if the feedback has clear affective consequences. At this level, a key methodological improvement in the current research was to move away from the hypothetical scenarios that have been relied on in research on spontaneous causal attribution and to examine reactions to self-relevant, affectively involving positive and negative feedback. Our studies thus provided a fairer test of the effects of outcome valence on cognitive activity and, in contrast to Kanazawa's results, showed it to have a clear independent effect.
It should be noted, however, that the same affectively involving experimental context that allowed a powerful manipulation of outcome valence in the current studies likely placed expectancy information at a relevant disadvantage. It was never our intent to argue that the consistency of information with prior expectations has no effect on spontaneous cognitive activity or that the effects of expectancies and motivation on spontaneous thought are in any way mutually exclusive. In fact, the QOP view acknowledges explicitly that multiple factors (e.g., expectations, affect, incentives for accuracy) can affect how effortfully information is processed and that the ultimate impact of any single variable is a function of the strength of that variable relative to others in a particular decision context (see Ditto et al., 1998 , for a lengthy discussion of this point). As such, our central critique of past research on spontaneous cognitive activity was that its tendency to rely on hypothetical scenarios was better suited to manipulating cognitive variables such as expectancies than generating the genuine affective reaction necessary to reveal the role of motivational factors in judgment. By the same token, however, the bogus diagnosis paradigm used in the current study may have reversed this advantage and consequently given the impression that expectancies play only a weak role in spontaneous skepticism.
It should now be clear, based on a wealth of both research evidence and theoretical analysis, that both unexpected and unwanted information provoke spontaneous cognitive scrutiny. When manipulated appropriately, both factors have been demonstrated to have an independent effect on cognitive activity, and whether one or the other variable predominates in a given research context is likely due to variations in the strength of the particular experimental manipulations used.
4 Furthermore, there is no theoretical inconsistency in both variables having an effect on spontaneous thought. Several decades of social cognition research have revealed the intensity of cognitive processing as a central mechanism through which a host of factors affect judgment outcomes (Bargh, 1984; Chaiken, 1987; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Schwarz, 1990) . A key goal of the QOP view has been to reunite research on motivated reasoning with the broader informationprocessing literature by demonstrating that motivational factors affect judgments via the same mechanisms as other more traditional "cognitive" factors (Ditto et al., 1998) .
Indeed, the reason that the effects of the expectations and preferences have historically been so difficult to disentangle is that (a) they have analogous effects on cognitive processes and (b) the two variables are almost always "naturally confounded" in that unwanted outcomes are generally also unexpected. It is this latter problem, in particular, on which the current studies may help to shed light. Perhaps the most intriguing finding from the current studies concerned the complicated relation found between expectancy and outcome information. Past research on spontaneous causal reasoning has (implicitly or explicitly) made the simplifying assumption that if expectancy and outcome information have effects, those effects are completely independent of one another. Research in other domains, however, challenges this view. Beginning with Festinger's (1957) original statement of cognitive dissonance theory, for example, a number of researchers have argued that expectancy disconfirmation, in and of itself, is likely to engender an affective response (e.g., Mandler, 1990) . This is particularly true if the disconfirmed expectation is part of a wellestablished system of beliefs (Munro & Ditto, 1997) . Moreover, the magnitude of affective reactions to outcome information can be affected by its perceived likelihood in that people tend to have more extreme affective reactions (either positive or negative) the more unexpected the outcome (Feather, 1969) . Conversely, a large body of social psychological research also suggests that outcome desirability affects perceived likelihood judgments (e.g., Irwin, 1953; Marks, 1951; Weinstein, 1980) . Consistent with this latter body of research, the results of the current studies suggest that the affective implications of the diagnostic outcome information affected the subjective likelihood of favorable and unfavorable diagnoses. Pains were taken in the study to equate, from a "rational" perspective, the perceived likelihood of the favorable and unfavorable diagnoses. In addition to supplying identical prevalence information for both outcomes, we took measures to dissuade participants from using their current lack of symptomatology as evidence of the implausibility of having the unfavorable diagnosis (the TAA test instructions stated that symptoms of TAAnegativity are rarely experienced before the age of 30 and all participants were younger than age 30). Despite our vigorous attempts to equate objective probabilities, however, participants consistently rated the favorable diagnosis as subjectively more likely than the unfavorable diagnosis. The fact that this effect disappeared in Study 3 when the target of the likelihood judgment was not themselves but another generalized college student provides support for the motivated nature of this effect.
What this suggests, then, is that the natural confounding of expectations and preferences is due, at least in part, to the effect of preferences on expectations. That is, people do not expect negative events to happen to them because they do not want negative events to happen to them. This analysis, of course, is not particularly novel to anyone familiar with the literature on unrealistic optimism, and yet the implications of this kind of nonindependence between cognitive and motivational factors seem to frequently become lost by researchers caught up in the struggle to cleanly parse the two. In the current context, for example, preferences may be expected to have a sort of "double whammy" effect on skeptical reactions to unwanted information. That is, people may be relatively skeptical consumers of preferenceinconsistent than preference-consistent information directly because of their more negative affective reaction to unwanted information (i.e., preferences have an independent effect on spontaneous skepticism). At the same time, however, preference-inconsistent information also may be met with a relatively skeptical reaction because it seems subjectively unlikely to have occurred. The rub, of course, is that it is precisely because the information is undesirable that leads it to be perceived as subjectively surprising to begin with.
The current research only hints at the possibility of such complicated interactions of motivational and cognitive influences in reactions to positive and negative feedback. Additional research is certainly needed to confirm and explore these effects. The results of the current studies, however, are consistent with a growing body of theory and research challenging simple notions of a motivation-cognition dichotomy and suggest that a host of interesting research possibilities lie in charting the complicated ways that our thoughts and feelings may interact. NOTES 1. Videotapes of four participants had recording problems. Therefore, analyses for the behavioral measures are based on 88 participants.
2. All items included in the indexes were significantly correlated: positive and negative affect difference scores, r(92) = -.26, p < .02; pretest likelihood and posttest surprise scores, r(92) = -.43, p < .001; and decision latency and rechecking behavior, r(88) = .31, p < .01.
3. Because of the relatively modest correlation between positive and negative affect scores found in this and past research (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) , as well as some evidence suggesting different roles for positive and negative affect in defensive reactions (Aspinwall, 1998) , we also conducted the hierarchical regression analyses using the (uncombined) positive and negative affect indexes as predictors. These analyses produced results identical to those reported except that whereas positive affect continued to be a significant predictor of spontaneous skepticism at Step 2, ∆R 2 = .05, F inc (1, 86) = 4.95, p < .03, the effect of negative affect was only marginally significant, ∆R 2 = .07, F inc (1, 86) = 3.26, p < .08.
4. In past research using the bogus diagnosis paradigm, prevalence information has been found to have a significant effect on reactions to both positive and negative medical diagnoses (e.g., Ditto & Jemmott, 1989) . Because of their central concern with the effects of prevalence information on evaluations, these studies used stronger manipulations than those used in Study 2. Thus, we suspect that if a stronger manipulation of prevalence information was used in Study 2, a stronger effect on spontaneous skepticism would have been observed.
